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Miss Mildred McClelland, L.L.B., is a graduate of John 
Marshall Law School and has for several years been associated 
with Frank A. Constangy, whose legal practice is restricted to 
labor relations and related matters.
During the life of the War Labor Board, later the War 
Stabilization Board, she served as an Industry Member of the 
Southern Regional Board and was the only woman ever ap­
pointed to serve in that capacity. She also served as a staff 
member of the Industry Advisory Council, representing em­
ployers in the Southeast before the War Labor Board.
A student of accounting and a former professional statis­
tician with the Federal Government, much of Miss McClelland’s 
present practice relates to wage and hour legislation, wage 
arbitration, and the formulation and interpretation of wage 
incentive systems, all of which require statistical skill as well 
as specialized legal training.
In this paper, which was the basis of a talk given by her 
before the Atlanta chapter ASWA, she has therefore drawn 
upon a wide personal experience in labor relations matters.
On this highly controversial subject The Woman CPA., 
AWSCPA, and ASWA have taken no stand and sponsor no 
opinions, but offer Miss McClelland’s article for its interest 
alone.
THE TAFT HARTLEY ACT
By MILDRED McCLELLAND, L.L.B.
In discussing the subject of the Taft 
Hartley Act and its effect on labor relations, 
I shall not spend time attempting to develop 
a specious kinship between labor relations 
and accounting. As accountants, you are 
essentially an integral part of management 
and as good accountants you are not only 
interested in where your business has been 
and where it is heading, but you are inter­
ested in all of the factors that influence its 
course. Today no one single factor has 
more bearing on the success or failure of 
a business than labor relations.
If you, by any chance, are not deceived 
about these changes made by this present 
Congress in the basic labor law of the 
country, it is not the fault of any union, 
because so far as I know there has never 
been such concerted effort on the part of 
any group as is now fully underway by the 
labor unions in an attempt to deceive the 
public and by every device of propaganda 
to convince them that the Taft Hartley Act 
is unfair, unjust, and was designed to de­
stroy organized labor.
We have an amazing situation. Six 
months ago the Wagner Act was the basic 
Federal law governing relations between 
management and employees. It was called 
labor’s “Magna Carta.” It was called the 
most progressive, socially advanced, and 
enlightened law on the statute books.
Three months ago certain changes and 
amendments were made in this law— 
changes so drastic, according to the same 
labor leaders, so revolutionary, so unfair, 
as to make this same basic law an anathema 
to all these fair-minded labor leaders, who 
now refer to it unanimously as the “Slave 
Labor Law.” I am sure you will be inter­
ested to know just what destructive 
changes were made in the law to effect this 
violent reversal.
The reason for the Wagner Act was 
given in its statement of policy. The rea­
son was that denial by some employers of 
the right of employees to organize and the 
refusal by some employers to accept the 
procedure of collective bargaining leads to 
strikes and other forms of industrial strife 
and unrest, and that experience has proved 
that protection by law of the right of em­
ployees to organize and bargain collectively 
has a good and beneficent effect on com­
merce and industry generally. This was 
the basis of the Wagner Act, and its justi­
fication.
Not one word of this has been changed 
in the Taft Hartley Act, but something new 
has been added, to wit: “Experience has 
further demonstrated that certain practices 
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by some labor organizations’ officers and 
members . . . impair the interest of the 
public.” In other words when the law places 
the whole burden and blame for the ob­
struction of commerce and the labor unrest 
on the employers alone, it is a Magna Carta. 
When the law admits, as any school boy 
knows, that unions and union leaders may 
sometimes contribute to labor unrest as 
well as employers, the Magna Carta be­
comes a Slave Labor Law.
Both the Wagner Act and the Taft Hart­
ley Act are concerned with the rights of 
employees. In section 7 of each act these 
rights are set forth as follows:
“Employees shall have the right to self­
organization, to form, join, or assist labor 
organizations, to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted 
activities for the purpose of collective bar­
gaining or other mutual aid or protection.” 
Not one of these guarantees has been done 
away with, reduced, or weakened in any 
respect under the Taft Hartley Act. What 
has been done under the Taft Hartley Act 
is to give the rank and file employees addi­
tional rights which everyone must recog­
nize were sorely needed.
Here are the additional rights. “Employ­
ees shall also have the right to refrain from 
any or all such activities. . . .” That is the 
essential difference between the Wagner Act 
and the Taft-Hartley Act. Under the old 
law employees could be organized into labor 
unions and bargain collectively with em­
ployers through representatives of their own 
choosing. Under the law they had no guar­
anteed right to refrain from such activities. 
That right they had to find in other laws 
or in the Constitution of the United States, 
if they could.
As a practical matter, the unions could 
and did herd employees into groups and take 
away from them their individual bargaining 
rights by coercion, fraud, threats and vio­
lence and the employees were powerless to 
help themselves. Their employers were 
powerless to help them and the only persons 
completely free were professional union or­
ganizers and officers. This was the Magna 
Carta of labor officials. And their unquali­
fied approval was of the license granted 
them to exploit the worker. They were in­
terested in the liberty granted him only 
in so far as they could arrogate that liberty 
to themselves. Obviously the greatest free­
dom for the worker existed in unions they 
themselves formed and controlled. Labor 
leaders hated such unions with uncontrolled 
bitterness.
Let us see what happened to these inde­
pendent unions under the Wagner Act. Less 
than 1% of these hopeful ventures exist 
today. You may judge for yourself whether 
it had anything to do with it, but none of 
these independent unions had powerful lob­
bies in Washington and almost everyone of 
them was destroyed just as soon as they 
attracted the attention of the National 
Labor Relations Board—which in turn was 
just as soon as the A. F. of L or the C.I.O. 
expressed a desire to supersede them. You 
might be interested in the legal procedure 
and rationalization of this slaughter of the 
innocents.
Under both the Wagner Act and the Taft- 
Hartley Act an employer is forbidden to 
interfere with the formation or administra­
tion of any labor organization or to con­
tribute financial or other support to it. When 
domination or interference is found, the 
organization so dominated is outlawed. 
Under the Wagner Act, independent unions 
were outlawed under every possible pretext. 
In one case because the brother of the com­
pany’s attorney suggested that the employ­
ees could form their own union. In another 
case because the independent union adopted 
a constitution similar to that adopted by a 
dominated union. Both were disestablished 
and outlawed for those reasons by the 
N.L.R.B.
Without belaboring the point, I assure 
you I could quote instances equally enlight­
ening for hours. It is only too apparent that 
in practice at least, the Wagner Act pri­
marily benefited the big unions rather than 
employees, and the desires and rights to 
self-organization of employees have counted 
very little when opposed by the desires and 
rights of the proprietors of big unions. The 
astonishingly high mortality rate of inde­
pendent unions is in connection with the fact 
that in each case either the A. F. of L. or 
C.I.O. desired to represent the employees. 
Anyone who in the face of the facts and the 
official records considers these statements 
unfair or inaccurate is at liberty to do so.
Now, for the first time since the enact­
ment of the Wagner Act, an employee who 
does not want to be regimented into a union, 
who wants to keep and enjoy his own free­
dom of action, and do his own bargaining 
with his employer, has the right by law to 
do so, as well as the right by law to do the 
opposite if he prefers. This is what has con­
verted the Magna Carta of labor into the 
“Slave Labor Law.”
The Taft-Hartley Act specifically pro­
vides that in cases of representation the 
N.L.R.B. shall apply the same regulations 
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and rules to independent unions—actually 
self-organization—as to the great monopol­
istic A. F. of L. and C.I.O.
It seems clear now that to protect an 
employee against his employer but to leave 
him helpless against the big unions, is a 
Magna Carta—to protect them against both 
his employer and the big unions is a Slave 
Labor Law.
It should be noted that under the old law 
the definitions of unfair labor practices 
were such that they could be committed by 
no one except an employer. The identical 
act performed by a labor union or its repre­
sentative without any prohibition what­
ever, became a crime when done by an em­
ployer. Nowhere in the act was the employer 
as such given any rights whatever and many 
of the rights supposed to be extended to 
everyone were severely restricted if applied 
to an employer.
The powers given the N.L.R.B. to effec­
tuate the purposes of the act far surpass 
those of any court known up to that time or 
since. The Board was given absolute au­
thority to establish in any manner it saw fit 
a suitable unit for collective bargaining. 
It could prosecute or refuse to prosecute any 
•employer as it saw fit. It could and did make 
its own rules of evidence in trying an em­
ployer for violations of the act; and it could 
and did decide its cases without regard to 
the weight, or the preponderance, or the 
credibility of evidence and it could and did 
impute illegal intentions to employers in 
the absence of evidence and created a whole 
category of crimes by inference. You might 
be interested in some of the decisions taken 
at random.
The Republic Aircraft Company (56 
NLRB 1190) was found guilty of interfer­
ence because one of its foremen stated that 
the company could not afford to pay union 
wages. Gallup American Company (32 
NLRB 823) was found guilty of interference 
and unfair labor practice by “obliterating 
union signs, painted on boulders on the em­
ployer’s property without the employer’s 
permission where it was motivated by desire 
to prevent the union’s message from reach­
ing its employees. Such finding does not 
interfere with respondent’s right to main­
tain its property as it sees fit.”
Denver Tent and Awning Company (47 
NLRB 586) committed an unfair labor prac­
tice by “posting a rule stating that ‘solicita­
tions of any kind on these premises are 
strictly forbidden; violation of this rule will 
be cause for discharge.’ ” The pleas of the 
employer that the purpose of the rule was to 
avoid interference with production of ma­
terials for the United States Army were 
unavailing, it being the opinion of the 
Board that the rule was promulgated and 
enforced to discourage union membership, 
notwithstanding its obvious need to protect 
production.
Revlon Products Company (48 NLRB 
1202) was guilty of an unfair labor prac­
tice in changing the lunch hour of female 
employees to an hour different from that of 
the male employees, it being the opinion of 
the Board that the employer, among other 
reasons, made this change to prevent the 
men—most of whom were union members— 
from urging the girls to join the union.
The N.L.R.B. found Peter J. Schweitzer, 
Inc., guilty of an unfair labor practice be­
cause the company treated its employees 
well and thus forestalled a union movement. 
In this case, however, the Board was re­
versed by the District Court of Appeals.
You are probably wondering what had 
happened to the Constitution of the United 
States and how the Federal Courts have 
upheld such decisions. The answer lies in 
the fact that the Board was given no legal 
authority to enforce its own orders and with 
no authority in itself to enforce orders, it 
could not legally injure anyone by any 
decision, however it might contravene the 
Constitution.
But here is the catch. Having issued its 
orders it could appeal to the Federal Courts 
to enforce them, and in such an appeal the 
Federal Courts were bound to accept the 
Board’s finding of fact provided only that 
there was evidence to support its findings. 
Note that the word “evidence” is unquali­
fied—not valid evidence— not weight of 
evidence—not credible evidence—but simply 
“evidence.” Bear in mind also that the Board 
in its trials might and did freely disregard 
the established rules of evidence. From 
time to time there have crept into the de­
cisions of the Circuit Courts of Appeal par­
ticularly acid comment which has indicated 
that they did not enjoy rendering such deci­
sions in favor of the Board. But they had 
no choice.
Now under the Taft-Hartley law the hear­
ings of the N.L.R.B. must be conducted so 
far as practicable in accordance with the 
rules of evidence prevailing in the Federal 
District Courts. The new law also requires 
that the Board must be convinced by a pre­
ponderance of evidence in unfair labor prac­
tice cases and also provides that the findings 
of fact of the Board are conclusive upon the 
reviewing courts if supported by “substan­
tial” evidence in the record considered as 
a whole.
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Without attempting to cover all of the 
unusual and what many laymen and lawyers 
have long considered outrageous features of 
the old law, let me mention a few more or 
less at random.
The Wagner Act required an employer 
to bargain in good faith with the union 
representing its employees. It imposed no 
such obligation on the union. In practice 
the only possible way an employer could 
prove that he had fulfilled this obligation 
was to continue to make concessions as 
long as the union continued to make 
demands.
The new law provides that an employer 
may bargain in good faith without neces­
sarily yielding to the demands of the union. 
It also provides that the union must bar­
gain in good faith, without necessarily 
yielding to the demands of the employer.
An important part of the Wagner Act 
consists of legal definitions, for the purpose 
of this act only, entirely at variance with 
the meaning of such terms in all other 
body of the law. For example, included in 
the definition of employer under the 
Wagner Act is “any person acting in the 
interest of the employer.” Under this lan­
guage the Board frequently imputed to 
employers anything that anyone connected 
with the employer, no matter how remotely, 
said or did, notwithstanding that the em­
ployer had not authorized what was said 
or done, and in many cases had even pro­
hibited it. By such rulings the Board often 
was able to punish employers for things 
they did not do, did not authorize and tried 
to prevent.
You may be interested that these are not 
my words but are taken verbatim from the 
House Committee’s Report on the Labor 
Management Relations Act. Anyone who 
is interested in the truth or falsity of this 
statement is referred to the matter of 
American Steel Scraper Company (29 
NLRB 939), Schulte Trailers (28 NLRB 
975,993), American Oil Company (14 
NLRB 990).
Under the Taft Hartley Act the term 
“employer” includes anyone acting as an 
agent of an employer, directly or indi­
rectly. Under this definition the employer 
can still be held responsible for the acts 
of supervisors. The new definition should 
change the policy of finding outside asso­
ciations and outside parties to be employers 
without any conceivable relationship in 
agency.
Under the Wagner Act, whereas a union 
might petition at any time to be certified 
as the representative of a group of em­
ployees, no provision whatever was made 
for decertification, and neither the employer 
nor the employees could petition to end a 
situation which thus frequently existed 
where a union continued to be the sole 
agent for the employees although not one 
employee was a member of the union, and 
every employee was violently opposed to 
the union. There now exists any number 
of such situations. And an employer in 
those circumstances must consult with and 
bargain with the union concerning any 
feature of his relations with his employees 
even though the union has no conceivable 
interest or responsibility and has not a 
single member in the bargaining unit.
As recently as July 1947, in the case of 
the Tishomingo County Electric Power 
Association the Board ordered the em­
ployer to bargain with the union although 
none of the employees belonged to the 
union and seven of the total of eight em­
ployees stated that they did not want a 
union. All these men were returning 
veterans who replaced workers who voted 
for the union in an earlier election.
Under the Taft Hartley Act this situation 
could be corrected. Unions may be decer­
tified by a secret ballot of employees to 
be held on petition filed by thirty percent 
of the employees, if the majority of those 
voting vote to reclaim their rights to bar­
gain for themselves.
In literally hundreds of cases, employers 
under the old act who discharged employees 
for conduct which unquestionably justified 
discharge were nevertheless found guilty 
of an unfair labor practice because the 
Board “inferred from what the employer 
may have said, perhaps a long time before” 
that he was opposed to labor unions. For 
the sake of my own reputation for veracity 
let me refer you to page 33 of House 
Report 245—80th Congress.
Under the Taft Hartley Act employees 
still cannot be discriminated against for 
union activity or otherwise interfered with 
in their right to organize, but employees 
may now be discharged for cause. The 
act provides that “no order of the Board 
shall require the reinstatement of any 
individual as an employee who has been 
suspended or discharged, or the payment 
to him of any back pay, if such individual 
was suspended or discharged for cause.”
Some of the difficulties of an exhaustive 
explanation of this act in a short space may 
be understood in the light of the fact that 
simply reading the act required 42 minutes. 
It is predicted freely by the unions that 
the Taft Hartley Act will destroy the labor 
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movement. The adjectives “unjust,” “out­
rageous,” “fascist,” and “Hitleresque” are 
among the milder characteristics of it by 
labor officials; but not one layman out of 
10,000 has read it, and not one lawyer 
out of a hundred has read it. Here are 
some of its provision very briefly:
It provides that not only an employer but 
a union as well may be guilty of an unfair 
labor practice and that coercion, threats or 
violence either to employees or employers is 
such an unfair labor practice. It requires 
unions as well as employers to bargain in 
good faith. It forbids them to boycott or 
strike against employers not concerned in 
the original labor dispute or to force em­
ployers to hire and pay people they do not 
want or need. It forbids unions to strike to 
compel employers to violate the law or orders 
of the N.L.R.B.
It outlaws the closed shop but permits 
union shop to be negotiated where a major­
ity of the employees affected desire it. It 
gives employees the right to bargain either 
collectively or individually as they decide 
for themselves.
It permits the employer and the union the 
right of free speech if such speech contains 
no threat of reprisal or force or promise of 
benefit which might interfere with collec­
tive activities.
It requires the N.L.R.B. to apply the same 
rules of justice to an independent union that 
it does to the A. F. of L. or C.I.O. It pro­
vides that the Board hearings must be con­
ducted so far as practicable in accordance 
with the rules of evidence prevailing in the 
Federal District Courts.
It permits an employer or an employee to 
petition for an election as well as a union. 
It permits an employee to refuse to join a 
union, as well as to join it.
It permits the N.L.R.B. to obtain a court 
injunction to stop a jurisdictional strike or 
a boycott against an employer not involved 
in a dispute. It permits the N.L.R.B. to seek 
temporary court relief against unfair labor 
practices of either a union or an employer. 
It permits the N.L.R.B. to decertify unions 
after secret ballot of employees.
It forbids the N.L.R.B. to certify a union 
or make available its processes to a union 
whose controlling officers or any of them 
are Communists or which fails to report in 
confidence to the Secretary of Labor and to 
its members its financial operations.
Employers are still liable for refusal to 
bargain. Unions can still file charges against 
an employer for unfair labor practices such 
as domination of a union, discrimination 
against employees who file charges or testify 
before the labor board concerning violations 
of the act.
The outstanding impression that I get of 
this act is that the employee who merely 
works for a living without playing union 
politics—the man whom Mr. Justice Jackson 
referred to as “the forgotten man”—in the 
administration of labor legislation at last 
gets a break; and the other is that what 
ought to be a legal maxim, even if it is not, 
is applied in labor relations now as it 
always has been in all other law. That 
maxim is—what is sauce for the goose, is 
sauce for the gander.
TAX NEWS
(Continued from page 7) 
ished goods for which there are no quota­
tions. If the taxpayer has a firm sales con­
tract which protects him against loss, goods 
should be inventoried at cost despite the fact 
that the taxpayer’s basis is lower of cost or 
market. The taxpayer must apply his basis 
directly to each item in the inventory rather 
than to the total inventory or the total of 
each class of items. Statement 6 of the 
research bulletin defining “lower of cost or 
market” sets forth several principles which 
have not been ruled upon for income tax 
purposes. The accounting research commit­
tee has retained the term “market,” but 
has indicated that “market” as used in the 
term “lower of cost or market” is to be 
interpreted as “useful cost.” While the 
Treasury Department and the Courts have 
conceded that “market” could be determined 
in a manner other than by a quoted price, 
the regulations retain the bid price defini­
tion.
If a change in inventory pricing methods 
is contemplated, the taxpayer should con­
sider that the changed method may not be 
used for income tax purpose without the 
Commissioner’s permission. Application for 
permission to change the method of account­
ing employed must be filed within 90 days 
after the beginning of the taxable year in 
which the change is to be effected.
BUY U. S. SAVINGS BONDS
In times like these, thrift and saving go 
beyond individual concern. They are a 
matter of national concern. Today, the col­
lective thrift habits of a nation will actively 
affect every member of a nation’s society.
Secretary Snyder, at the Herald- 
Tribune Forum
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